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In this paper we consider a simple model of horizontal diﬀerentiation and derive the
closed form solutions for the level of the variables in the decentralized economy and in
the social planner case. This enables us to analyze consumers’ welfare as a function of
the parameter representing market power. We surprisingly ﬁnd that, when the total labor
force is greater than a certain level, the welfare function is an inverted-N shape in the
decentralized economy and monotonically decreasing in the centralized economy. This
suggests that there is another eﬀect which interacts with market power: the degree of
returns to specialization.
Keywords: Closed form solutions; Welfare; Competition; Degree of returns to specializa-
tion.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C61, L16, L4, O31, O33.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze consumers’ welfare as a function of a parameter representing the de-
gree of competition. We consider the simplest endogenous growth R&D based model reported
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Ch.6, which is a simpliﬁed version of Romer’s (1990) model.
In this setup R&D aims to expand the number of existing varieties of the intermediate goods
and it uses labor. It is also assumed that intermediate goods are not durable.
By starting from the decentralized economy analysis we are able to derive the expression
for consumers’ welfare since we provide the closed form solutions for the trajectories of all the
key variables. Usually economists have studied non-linear dynamical systems of endogenous
growth models in a qualitative way, that is using the phase diagram and completed this
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1analysis with a quantitative one, linearizing around the steady state after having applied
the so called reduction dimension strategy. This technique consists in the deﬁnition of new
variables in terms of ratio between the original ones and it is generally not suﬃcient to be fully
conclusive about the dynamic properties of the original variables in levels. We solve instead the
dynamical system analytically. In particular we derive the diﬀerential equation which describes
the dynamics of the amount of labor used in R&D. We obtain a Riccati diﬀerential equation
which admits two steady states: one is the balanced growth path solution of Barro and Sala-
i-Martin Ch. 6, and it is unstable, the other, which is equal to the total labor force, which is
stable. After solving it we provide the explicit solution for the trajectory of consumption. We
solve for the optimal trajectories by using the transversality condition and we ﬁnd that for it
to be satisﬁed the labor force allocated in R&D at time zero must be set equal to its balanced
growth path solution. This proves that the model does not exhibit transitional dynamics. We
can also determine the initial value for consumption by using market clearing condition for the
ﬁnal good at time zero. This allows us to compute the value of consumers’ welfare, a result
that is not usual to be found in literature, given that models usually do not allow for closed
form solutions. We then solve the social planner’s maximization problem and derive also in
this case the level of consumption and the related welfare function.
The previous results enable us to undertake a comparative static analysis. In this model
an increase in market power, represented by a reduction of the parameter α, reduces the
decentralized economy’s growth rate, since it causes a reallocation of the ﬁxed labor force
toward the ﬁnal good sector, slowing down the R&D production, which in turns constitutes
the engine of growth. This result places this model in the debate on the relationship between
competition and growth in R&D-Based Growth Models. The ﬁrst generation of Schumpeterian
growth models of vertical diﬀerentiation (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt
1992, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) predicts that innovation and hence growth should decline
with competition, because more competition reduces the rents that reward successful inno-
vators (this is the so called Schumpeterian eﬀect). This discourages ﬁrms from investing in
R&D, thus reducing the innovation rate and as a consequence the long run growth rate of the
economy. However the empirical literature of the Nineties (Gerosky 1995, Blundell, Griﬃth
and Van Reenen 1999) suggests a positive correlation between competition and growth. On
the contrary models of horizontal diﬀerentiation are less conclusive on the predictions. The
model considered in this paper (Romer’s 1990 model) predicts a positive relationship between
competition and growth, while Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, Chapter 3) model predicts
a negative relationship (see Bucci 2003 for a review). Recently it has been shown some evi-
dence in favor of a bell- shaped relationship between competition and growth (Aghion et al.
2005). Few are the explanations provided by the literature. For example Aghion et al. (2005)
explain the bell-shaped form by means of the interaction between the Schumpeterian eﬀect









































1allocation eﬀect and the Schumpeterian eﬀect1 . Finally, Onori’s (2010) explanation relies on
the presence of a spillover eﬀect stemming from the intermediate good sector that may prevail
over the Schumpeterian eﬀect.
On the other hand, the social planner’s growth rate is independent from market power index
because she corrects this market failure. Hence we would expect a positive eﬀect of an increase
in α on consumers’ welfare in the decentralized economy and no eﬀect on social planner’s
welfare. However we surprisingly ﬁnd that, when the total labor force is greater than a certain
level, consumers’ welfare in the decentralized economy is an inverted-N shaped function of
α, while the welfare level of the centralized economy is a monotonically decreasing function
of α. This suggests that there exists an additional eﬀect which interacts with market power
decrease. This eﬀect is negative and is represented by the decrease of the degree of returns to
specialization. The degree of returns to specialization measures the degree to which the society
beneﬁts from “specializing” production between a larger number of intermediates. Hence in
the social planner’s case an increase in α simply reduces the degree of returns to specialization,
so explaining the monotonically decreasing welfare function. In the decentralized economy the
negative eﬀect of a reduction of the degree of returns to specialization may prevail over the
positive eﬀect of a reduction of market power, giving raise to an inverted-N shaped function.
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we brieﬂy present the model and
we derive the closed form solutions for labor force employed in R&D and for consumption
in the decentralized economy and in the social planner’s case. Section 3 provides the welfare
analysis, ﬁnally section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The decentralized economy
In this section we brieﬂy describe the model of horizontal diﬀerentiation shown in Ch. 6 of
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), in the decentralized economy case.
There are three diﬀerent productive sectors. The undiﬀerentiated ﬁnal good is produced
by using labor and intermediated goods and it is sold in a perfectly competitive market2. The
technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function:






1Bucci (2005) generalizes the model considered in the present paper to the case in which labor is used also
in the production of the intermediate goods.









































1where (L − LR (t)) is the work force used in the ﬁnal good production3, xj (t) is the quantity
employed of the jth intermediate good and 0 <α<1. The total labor force L is constant
over time.
The ﬁrst order conditions of ﬁnal good producers’ determine the demand function for each






1−α (L − LR (t))
w(t)=( 1− α)Y (t)/(L − LR (t)).
R&D ﬁrms face a two-stage decision process. In the ﬁrst stage, they decide whether
to devote resources to invent a new brand. They will invest until the point in which the
expected ﬂow of future proﬁts equals the R&D cost. In the second stage, the inventors,
provided by a perpetual patent, enter the intermediate good sector and chose the optimal
price at which to sell their new product. Hence the intermediate goods industry is imperfectly
competitive and each producer uses the same technology: one unit of the ﬁnal good is needed
to produce one unit of intermediate good. Hence the proﬁt of each monopolist is given by
πj (t)=pjxj (t)−xj (t) and the monopolistic price is pj = 1
α,∀j. Using these informations we
obtain the produced quantity of each intermediate good xj (t)=x(t)=( L − LR (t))α
2
1−α,∀j.
The R&D sector is perfectly competitive and there is a positive spillover eﬀect attached
to the available stock of disembodied knowledge (approximated by the existing number of
designs, N (t)) in discovering a new product variety: that is to produce a new variety of good
it is necessary to employ
η
N(t) units of labor and η>0 represents a cost parameter. Hence the





As the research sector is perfectly competitive, new ﬁrms will enter each R&D race until the
proﬁt is zero. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin analysis is only focused on the balanced growth







1−αe−r(ν−t)dν = η (1 − α)α
2α
1−α.
The left hand side represents the beneﬁt of each innovator while the right and side is the cost
of doing R&D4. It can be rewritten as
3It can be interpreted as human capital.
4Since in this model labor is homogeneous and perfectly mobile, the wage rate is the same in the ﬁnal good












































Finally the representative household maximizes utility over an inﬁnite horizon. It consumes






s. t. ˙ a(t)=r(t)a(t)+w(t)L − C (t)






σ (r(t) − ρ)
˙ a(t)= r(t)a(t)+w(t)L − C (t)
limt→+∞ C (t)
−σ a(t)e−ρt =0
In a general equilibrium setup the following relation between the consumer’s assets and
the number of varieties exists: a(t)=N (t)η (1 − α)α
2α
1−α.
Given the market clearing condition for consumption good and the fact that the aggregate
output is proportional to the number of varieties (Y (t)=N (t)(L − LR (t))α
2α
1−α), in the
balanced growth path (BGP hereafter) all the variables grow at the same positive and constant
growth rate:
gY = gC = gX = gN = g =
¯ LR
η










2.2 The closed form solutions
In this section we derive the optimal trajectories for the labor force employed in R&D and
consumption. We prove that the model does not exhibit transitional dynamics.





(L − LR (ν))α
2
1−αe−¯ r(t,ν)(ν−t)dν = η (1 − α)α
2α
1−α
with respect to time. We remind that in this case the interest rate is the average over the
period: ¯ r(t,ν)= 1
ν−t
´ ν

























































(L − LR (t))α
2
1−α + r(t)B (t). (2.1)





α(L − LR (t))
η
. (2.2)











In order to obtain the diﬀerential equation describing the dynamics LR (t),w eu s et h eﬁ n a l
good market clearing condition:
Y (t)=C (t)+N (t)x(t),
where X (t)=Nx(t) is the aggregate quantity of produced intermediate goods.
Since the quantity produced by each intermediate ﬁrm is given by x(t)=( L − LR (t))α
2
1−α,
we can rewrite the ﬁnal output as Y (t)=N (t)(L − LR (t))α
2α
1−α. Using these informations,






N (L − LR (t)).

















L − LR (t)
.


























































































which is the solution we get with the BGP analysis, and
¯ LR2 = L
so that in this case the economy would end up starving in the long run.
2.2.1 The trajectories of LR (t) and C (t)
In this section we derive the trajectories of LR (t) and C (t). Equation (2.5) is a Riccati
diﬀerential equation. In order to solve it we need to guess a particular solution. The particular
solutions are the ones that solves the second degree polynomial on the right hand side, that
is the steady state solutions.















The integration constant d is given by







where LR (0), the initial value for the work force used in R&D, is not known in advance since
LR (t) is not a predetermined variable5. Equation (2.6) becomes
LR (t)=L +
￿￿




















If we take the limit for t → +∞ we obtain
lim
t→+∞
LR (t)=L = ¯ LR2









































1Figure 2.1: Possible trajectories of LR (t)









Graphically the possible trajectories, for each possible initial value LR (0),o fLR (t) are
given by
Our aim is to determine the optimal trajectory among these.
For sake of simplicity the analysis will be conducted for the logarithmic utility case (σ =1 ).





































The integration constant f is given by
f = C (0)(L − LR (0))
α
1+α (2.9)
where consumption at time zero, C (0), has to be determined using the optimality conditions.










































In the following proposition we prove the optimality of the trajectory LR (t)=¯ LR1 =
αL−ηρ
1+α ,∀t, that is the economy immediately jumps on the BGP.
Proposition 1. The trajectory LR (t)=¯ LR1 =
αL−ηρ




Proof. In order to be optimal the solutions for LR (t) and C (t) given by, respectively, (2.7)






The total of consumer’s assets equal the market value of the intermediate ﬁrms:
a(t)=VN(t)=η (1 − α)α
2α
1−αN (t)
so the transversality condition can be rewritten as
lim
t→+∞




N (t)=0 . (2.10)
Plugging in equations (2.7) and (2.8) we obtain:
limt→+∞
￿


































where d =[ LR (0) − L]
−1 + 1+α
















depending on the sign of the constant d7.
Since all the remaining terms tend to a constant or to zero, for the transversality condition
to be satisﬁed a necessary condition is to have d =0 ⇐⇒ LR (0) = ¯ LR1. Given this, we can
7The constant d is negative for ¯ LR1 <L R (0) < ¯ LR2, it is positive for 0 <L R (0) < ¯ LR1,i ti se q u a lt oz e r o









































1determine the other constant f using the ﬁnal good market clearing condition at t =0 :
Y (0) = C (0) + N (0)X (0)





N (0)(L − LR (0))







L − ¯ LR1
￿









































In Proposition 1 we have just found a necessary condition for the transversality condition
to be satisﬁed. Actually there can be other values for the constant C (0) which satisfy it. To



















η (L + ρη)t
￿￿ α
1+α, we require that
exp
￿￿












In light of Proposition 1, the trajectory of consumption can be rewritten as
C (t)=α
2α
1−α (1 − α)N (0)(L + ρη)exp
￿
αL − ρη




Hence the initial level of consumption is optimally chosen in such a way that the economy
jumps on the BGP at t =0 .
2.3 The centralized economy
In this section we derive the closed form solution for consumption of a benevolent social planner


















































From the economy’s resource constraint we can derive an expression for consumption level
C (t)=( L − LR (t))
1−α N (t)x(t)
α − N (t)x(t) (2.12)





(L − LR (t))
1−α N (t)x(t)







The Pareto optimal solution for x(t), LR (t) and the growth rate are given by
xSO =( L − LR)α
1
1−α
LRSO = L − ρη
gSO = L
η − ρ.















3 Welfare, competition, specialization and growth
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of a change in α on consumers’ welfare of the decentralized
economy and compare them with the results of the centralized economy.
The parameter α plays two diﬀerent roles in this model: ﬁrst 1
α −1 is the mark up enjoyed
by innovators, so an increase in α reduces their market power; second it determines the degree
of returns to specialization8.









































1Deﬁnition. (Degree of returns to specialization (Benassy 1998)). The degree of returns to
specialization measures the degree to which the society beneﬁts from “specializing” production
between a larger number of intermediates N (t).
We now compute it for our economy. Since the intermediate industries are symmetric, the
production function of the ﬁnal good can be written as





α =( L − LR (t))
1−α N (t)x(t)
α .
Given that the aggregate quantity of intermediate goods is X (t)=N (t)x(t) the previous
expression rewrites as




where (1 − α) is the degree of returns to specialization. Hence an increase in α has a
negative eﬀect on it9.
3.1 The growth rates
For sake of comparison we report the expression of the growth rates of the decentralized
economy and of the centralized economy:
gDE =
αL − ρη
η (1 + α)
and gSO=L
η-ρ
We immediately note that
∂gDE
∂α > 0 while the social planner’s growth rate is independent
from α. This means that the growth rate of the decentralized economy only depends on
market power, given that the social planner eliminates this distortion. An increase in α rises
the growth rate of the decentralized economy because a reduction of the mark ups of all the
intermediate inputs makes it more proﬁtable for the ﬁnal good producer to substitute labor
force with intermediate goods. As a consequence, given that the total labor force is constant,
the quantity of human capital available for research increases and since this sector is the engine
of growth, the growth rate rises.
On the contrary, we will see in the next section that the degree of returns to specialization
plays a role on determining welfare.
constraint consumption is given by C (t)=( L − LR (t))
1−α ￿N(t)
j=1 (xj (t))
α − N (t)x(t),s oi td e p e n d sa l s o
linearly on x(t).










































13.2 The Welfare functions
In this section we prove that the relationship between welfare and α is monotonically decreasing
in the centralized economy, while it can be monotonically decreasing or an inverted-N shape
in the decentralized economy and we provide an economic interpretation.
Proposition 2. The relationship between consumers’ welfare and α in the centralized economy
is monotonically decreasing.



















































which is always negative since α ∈ (0,1).
The results for the decentralized economy are reported in the following Proposition:










10,t h er e l a -
tionship between α and the consumer’s welfare of the decentralized economy is an inverted-N
shape, otherwise it is a decreasing function of α.
Proof. (Cf. Appendix).
In Section 3.1 we saw that the growth rate of the decentralized economy is an increasing
function of α while the one of the centralized economy is independent from α. This result is
linked to social planner’s eﬀort to correct the distortion induced by monopoly. The results
showed in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 suggest that there are two interplaying eﬀect on
welfare stemming from an increase in α:
• a positive eﬀect: an increase in α reduces innovators’ market power (“competition eﬀect”);
• a negative eﬀect: an increase in α reduces the degree of returns to specialization (“degree










































1The relationship between welfare and α in the social planner case is negative and this means
that only the negative eﬀect of a reduction of the degree of returns to specialization plays a
role, since the social planner corrects the market imperfection. While the relationship between
welfare and α may be an inverted-N shape in the case of the decentralized economy. We








































These two functions are represented in the ﬁgure below
Figure 3.1: Degree of returns to specialization eﬀect (g (α)) and Competition eﬀect (h(α))









































1while being h(α) positive, it can be identiﬁed as the competition eﬀect. The presence of these
two eﬀects in the welfare function of the decentralized economy becomes much more evident
if we compare equation (3.2) with the derivative of the welfare function in the social planner’s
case, as given by equation (3.1). The latter function shows the same behavior as g (α), while we
have already underlined that the competition eﬀect is not present in the centralized economy,
hence we do not observe the part which depends positively on α.
The position of h(α) in the graph depends on the values of the parameters L, η and ρ:a si t
is showed by the suﬃcient condition provided by Proposition 3, the greater is L and the lower
are η and ρ, the greater is the possibility that h(α) and the symmetric of g (α) cross twice11,
hence the ﬁrst derivative has two zeros and the welfare function is an inverted-N shape.
Graphically:
Figure 3.2: Interaction between Degree of returns to specialization eﬀect and Competition
eﬀect
L is the economy’s total human capital. A high L means that there will be more labor
force to be employed in R&D12. But this is exactly the scale eﬀect, a well known shortcoming
of this model. η is the R&D parameter cost. The smaller is η, the lower is the cost of R&D
and the higher will be the resources engaged in expanding brands. Finally, ρ is the consumers’
discount rate. The lower is ρ, the higher is consumers’ willingness to save, and the higher is
their investment in R&D13. These eﬀects are assimilable to the eﬀect of an increase of α on
11This pushes h(α) up in the graphic.
12Recall that it is:
∂ ¯ LR1
∂L > 0.









































1the growth rate of the decentralized economy through a reduction of the mark up and explain
the positive sloped branch of the welfare function.
We can also say more about how the two eﬀects determine the shape of the welfare function
in the decentralized economy. This explanation is related to the second derivative of the
welfare function. The competition eﬀect has a positive eﬀect on welfare but it is decreasing
in α: as competition increases, even if human capital resources to be employed in R&D are
a lot, innovators loose any incentive to invest in R&D because they are deprived of their
market power. On the other hand the degree of returns to specialization is not monotonic in
α. Remember Figure 3.1. When α is small, the degree of returns to specialization is high,
however the weight of the intermediate goods on the ﬁnal good production function is low:
the importance of the technological sector in the economy is small and the produced quantity
of each intermediate good x =( L − LR (t))α
2
1−α is very small. For this reason the degree
of returns to specialization eﬀect is strongly negative. As α increases, even if the degree of
returns to specialization is still negative, the function g (α) attains a maximum: the degree
of returns to specialization is still high (the maximum is attained for αMAX ￿ 0.383012), but
now the importance of the technological sector is higher than before and this explains why
the degree of returns to specialization eﬀect becomes less negative. When instead α is high
enough, the degree of returns to specialization becomes smaller and smaller, while the impact
of the intermediate sector is very high. This explains the decreasing branch of the function
g (α). To sum up, in the ﬁrst decreasing branch of the welfare function the degree of returns
to specialization eﬀect prevails over the competition eﬀect because it is true that the degree of
returns to specialization is high, but the importance of the intermediate sector is small. In the
increasing branch of the welfare function it is possible to see the positive eﬀect of an increase
in competition counterbalancing the negative eﬀect of the degree of returns to specialization
eﬀect. The last branch is negatively sloped because the the economy is close to a situation of
perfect competition, the importance of the technological sector has become very high so the
degree of returns to specialization dominates the competition eﬀect, hence we see the same
behavior of the welfare function as in the centralized economy case.
3.2.1 Numerical examples
In this section we provide some numerical examples in order to show the possible shapes that
the welfare in the decentralized economy can exhibit. We normalize the total human capital
L to one and we set the discount rate ρ equal to 0.03 14. Moreover we normalize the initial
number of designs to one and we let the R&D cost parameter free to vary because it is not
possible to calibrate it by using the balanced growth path restrictions since all of them involve
α and we cannot ﬁx it. By the suﬃcient condition of Proposition 3 that assures an inverted-N









































1shaped function we have to require that η ≤ L
Lρ ￿ 6.01257. Figure 3.3 represents the derivative
of the welfare function with respect to α and shows some values for η to have an inverted-N
function:
Figure 3.3: The sign of the ﬁrst derivative (L =1 , ρ =0 .03, N (0) = 1)
The following two ﬁgures show some examples in which the welfare function is decreasing










































1Figure 3.4: η = 10: The welfare function is monotonically decreasing
η =5 :










































1Figure 3.6: η =1 : The welfare function is an inverted-N shape
In the η =5case the maximum welfare is attained for a value of α ￿ 0.4791 which implies
a Lerner index15 of 0.5208, while in the η =1case the maximum is for α ￿ 0.8836 and
corresponding Lerner index is 0.1164. Both of these indexes are in line with Hall’s (1986)
estimations, being in the range [0.048, 0.705].
Given the expression of the ﬁrst derivative (3.2) it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd the turning points
analytically. We can provide a solution of equation (3.2) in a neighborhood of α =1 , which
corresponds to the value of α for which the welfare function attains a maximum. By rewriting





ρη (1 + α)




and by setting α =1− ￿, we obtain the following second order equation in ￿16:
ρη￿2 − (L +5 ρη)￿ +4 ρη =0
whose solutions are
￿1,2 =






(L +5 ρη) ±
￿
L2 +9 ρη2 + 10Lρη
2ρη
.
15In this model the mark up, as deﬁned as
Price−Marginal Cost
Marginal Cost ,i se q u a lt o
1
α − 1.T h eL e r n e ri n d e x ,w h i c hi s
ag o o da p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h ep r i c e - c o s tm a r g i n ,
Price−Marginal Cost




























































￿1 implies that α<0, while with ￿2 we get a solution for α in the interval (0,1) which is
given by:
α∗ =






This expression provides a good approximation of the value of α which maximizes welfare
in the decentralized economy, if it is in a neighborhood of 1. For example, in the η =1case,
the true value of α which maximizes welfare is 0.8836 and α∗ =0 .8954.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we considered the model of horizontal diﬀerentiation reported in Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004), Ch. 6, which is a simpliﬁed version of Romer’s (1990) model and derived
the closed form solutions for the level of the variables in the decentralized economy and in
the social planner case. This enabled us to analyze consumers’ welfare as a function of the
parameter representing the degree of competition. As is well known in this model an increase
in competition enhances the decentralized economy’s growth rate because it causes a realloca-
tion of human capital toward the R&D sector, while the centralized economy’s growth rate is
independent from the competition parameter because the social planner eliminates the distor-
tion due to the presence of monopolistic competition. As a result of welfare analysis, instead,
we surprisingly ﬁnd that, when the total labor force is greater than a certain level, the welfare
function is an inverted-N shape in the decentralized economy and monotonically decreasing
in the centralized economy. This suggests that there is another eﬀect which interacts with









































1Appendix. Proof of Proposition 3
Given the solution for the level of consumption:
C (t)DE = α
2α
1−α (1 − α)N (0)(L + ρη)exp
￿
αL − ρη
η (1 + α)
t
￿





































































This function is continuous for α ∈ (0,1) and limα→0 f (α)=l i m α→1 f (α)=−∞. However
given the fact that it depends on the parameters of the model, L, η and ρ,w ea r en o ta b l et o
say anything about the existence of some intersection with the α − axis17 and, if they exist,

















The function g (α) is continuous in (0,1), always negative, and concave. Moreover limα→0 g (α)=
limα→1 g (α)=−∞ . The function h(α) is continuous in (0,1), always positive, decreasing
and convex. Moreover limα→0 h(α)=
L+ρη
ρη and limα→1 h(α)=
L+ρη
4ρη (see Figure 3.1 in the
text).
In order to understand if there exist some values of α such that the sum of the two functions
is zero we take the symmetric of g (α) with respect to the α − axis, −g (α).I f −g (α) and
h(α) cross somewhere, this means that there exists a value of α such that f (α)=0 . Three
situations can arise, depending on the conﬁguration of the parameters of the model L, η and
17This would mean that the function U
∗









































1ρ (see Figure 3.2 in the text):
Case 1: h(α) and −g (α) do not intersect, hence the relationship between welfare and α
is monotonically decreasing;
Case 2: h(α) and −g (α) are tangent, hence the relationship between welfare and α is
monotonically decreasing and it just shows a change of concavity;
Case 3: h(α) and −g (α) cross twice, hence the relationship between welfare and α is an
inverted-N shape.
Given that h(0) =
L+ρη
ρη and h(1) =
L+ρη
4ρη , Case 3 is more likely to occur the greater is L and
the smaller are η and ρ18. To ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition for Case 3 to occur we compute h(α)









If h(αMIN) ≥− g(αMIN)20, the two functions intersect twice. This happens for
L ≥ L











18We will talk about the role of these parameters in Section 3.2.2.
19This value is approximately equal to αMIN ￿ 0.383012.
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